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RECASTING WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN AS
A SOURCE OF LONGER JURISDICTIONAL
REACH
David E. Seidelson*

Professor Seidelson discusses World-Wide Volkswagen's
primaryrationalethat the dueprocess clause is intendedto protect the nonresident defendantfrom jurisdictionalsurprise, and
proposes that World-Wide Volkswagen maypoint the way to a
longerjurisdictionalreach than some have contemplated After
exploring the jurisdictionalfunctions that the Supreme Court
has historically assignedto the due process clause, he critically
addresses the territorialsovereigntyfunction, demonstrates how
it was revived by the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, and
explains how this rationalemay work to increase, rather than
decrease, courtjurisdiction.
His conclusion is that World-Wide Volkswagen is aparadox. It limitsjurisdictionalreach by rejecting as a basisforjurisdiction the reasonablyforeseeablepresenceof a nonresident
defendant's injury-causingproductin theforum when thatpresence is attributable to intervening user conduct. At the same
time, however, it casts the due process clause in the role ofprotecting nonresident defendantsfrom jurisdictionalsurprise and
may point towarda longerjurisdictionalreach when a nonresident defendant's sign 'cant contacts with the forum make
*
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actions of aparticularkind reasonablyforeseeable,even though
the specific action did not arise out of those contacts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Some years ago, I proposed that the United States Supreme Court
should eliminate the due process inhibition on a state's ability to assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and permit the plaintiff the
forum of his choice, subject only to the defendant'sforum non conveniens motion to dismiss or its federal court equivalent, a section
1404(a) motion to transfer.' That seemed to me, and still does, the
I. Seidelson, JurisdictionOver Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "'MinimumContacts" and the
Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ. L. REv. 221 (1968). My proposal was predicated on utilization of a
mode of constructive service that is "reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with actual
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend." Id at 222. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940): "[The] adequacy [of substituted service] so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases and
employed is reasonably calculated to give. . . actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard." Id I would, of course, retain that due process requirement as to the mode of
service. The function of the forum non conveniens motion has been aptly described by many
courts:
The principle offorum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff
a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his
remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps
justice blended with some harrassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to
resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary,
even at some- inconvenience to himself.
Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with a discretion to
change the place of trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of witnesses and
the ends ofjustice. . . [Tihe problem is a very old one affecting the administration of
the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the
common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.
Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify
or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion
of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency
to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to
forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one most likely to be pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and allother practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. . . . It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
Like state courts, federal courts may resist imposition upon their jurisdiction:
The discretionary determinations of both the state and federal courts [confronted
with a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss and a 1404(a) motion to transfer, respec-
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sensible and logical extension of the continuing expansion of jurisdic-

tional reach which had been approved by both federal and state appellate court opinions.2 After all, any court that heard the action
tively] in this case required, to be sure, evaluations of similar, but by no means identical,
objective criteria. However, since the material facts underlying the application of these
criteria in each forum were different in several respects, principles ofresjudicata are not
applicable to the situation here presented.
Thus, for example, in determining that Cook County was an inconvenient forum,
the state court in this case could appropriately consider the availability of a state forum
at Ludington, Michigan, where [plaintiffs] alleged injury had occurred. But since there
is no federal court in Ludington, the federal district judge in making his determination
was limited to consideration of the alternative of a trial in the federal court in Grand
Rapids, a city some 60 miles from Ludington. Obviously, the question whether the convenience of the parties and of the witnesses would be better served by a trial in a state
court in Ludington is not the same question as whether those interests would be better
served by a trial in a federal court in Grand Rapids. Similarly, a trial judge weighing the
interests of justice could legitimately consider the condition of his court's docket an important factor. While docket congestion is a problem facing all trial courts in large
metropolitan areas, there is nothing to show that the problem in the federal court in
Chicago is identical in either nature or quantity to the problem in the Cook County court
system.
These considerations no more than illustrate the many variables which might affect
the exercise of discretion by a state court, as contrasted to a federal court, in any given
case.
Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 72-3 (1963) (footnote omitted).
The federal courts' power to resist jurisdiction is found in section 1404(a) of title 28: "For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1982). Section 1404(a) speaks of transfer only. But federal courts have retained their
dismissal powers:
The enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in 1948 did not. . . deprive Federal District
Courts of the power to dismiss, rather than transfer, an action for forum non conveniens
when the alternative forum is a state court or a court in a foreign country to which,
obviously, transfer is impossible.
Domingo v. States Marine Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811, 813 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (citing Fitzgerald v.
Westland Marine Corp., 369 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1966) and C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 44, at
165 (2d ed. 1970)). Accord McCarthy v. Canadian Nat'l. Ry., 322 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Mass. 1971).
However, the federal courts' dismissal power is now severely limited:
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens has flourished in the states since 1947, it
has largely been suspended in federal courts by the 1948 adoption of § 1404(a). Only in
rare instances where the alternative forum is a state court or the court of a foreign country may the federal court now dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 44, at 259-60 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted).
In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the Court held that a federal court is not
barred from granting a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss simply because the law of the
alternative forum (Scotland) is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum selected by
the plaintiff.
2. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (nonresident
insurer's issuance of a single life insurance policy to a forum resident subjected insurer to jurisdiction of forum in action arising out of that policy); Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950) (nonresident defendant's mail-order business, directed in part to forum, subjected defendant to forum's "Blue Sky Law"); Oregon ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or.
121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968) (Florida corporation's contracting with Oregon corporation subjected
Florida defendant to jurisdiction of Oregon court in action arising out of contract); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 761 (1961) (foreign corpora-

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1

presumably would possess the legal competence to resolve the issues
presented. And any inclination the court might have to apply its own
local law, perhaps as the result of undue parochialism, would be subject to constitutional restraints.3 In those circumstances, it seems unlikely that the defendant would be threatened with a deprivation of
property without due process. Then came World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.' That case made it rather apparent that the
Supreme Court did not approve of the expanded jurisdictional reach
which federal and state courts had permitted under the long-arm statutes. Perhaps now circumspection and discretion should counsel me
toward silence. Instead, however, I am going to suggest that WorldWide Volkswagen and its basic rationale may point toward a jurisdictional reach longer than some courts had contemplated.

II. A REVIEW OF

WORLD- WIDE VOLKSW4GEN

To support this proposition, it is necessary to review World-Wide
Volkswagen. The Robinson family's Audi automobile was rear-ended
by another vehicle in Oklahoma. That collision "causfed] a fire which
severely burned [Mrs.] Robinson and her two children." 5 To recover
for those injuries, plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, importer, regional
distributor, and retail dealer of the Audi, alleging that the fire had resulted from "defective design and placement of the Audi's gas tank and
fuel system."6 The action was brought in an Oklahoma state court.
The regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation
(Worldwide), and the retail dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway),
entered special appearances,7 challenging the court's jurisdiction. The
Robinsons, then residents of New York, had purchased the Audi from
tion's alleged negligence in manufacturing safety valve in Ohio, incorporated in water heater in
Pennsylvania, subjected defendant to jurisdiction of court in Illinois where heater exploded, injuring plaintiff), see supra text accompanying note 79; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (foreign corporation's reroofing of house of forum resident subjected
corporation to jurisdiction of forum in action alleging negligent performance).
3. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981). The
Court concluded that Minnesota's application of its own local law permitting the "stacking" of
uninsured motorist coverage, rather than Wisconsin's local law prohibiting such "stacking," was
permissible under the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1, and consistent with the
carrier's due process rights, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, because of Minnesota's "contacts.. .
with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation." 449 U.S. at
308.
4. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
5. Id at 288 (footnote omitted).
6. Id
7. Id (footnote omitted).
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Seaway in New York. Seaway, in turn, had acquired the Audi from
World-Wide, which distributed Audis to dealers in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut.' At the time of the collision in Oklahoma, the
Robinsons were in the process of relocating to a new home in Arizona.'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that the state's long-arm provision "conferr[ed] jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the United
States Constitution,"'" and concluded that the asserted jurisdiction was
consistent with due process."I The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed.' 2 The Court concluded that, although the intervening conduct of the Robinsons' driving their car in Oklahoma was reasonably
3
foreseeable, such conduct was superseding for jurisdictional purposes.'
Consequently, the presence of the car in Oklahoma did not constitute
minimum contacts between that state and the nonresident retail dealer
and distributor. The Court noted that:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. . . . The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of the laws," InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.' 4
Apparently, the Court concluded that the principal role of the due process clause was to protect nonresident defendants from jurisdictional
surprise.

III.

FUNCTIONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Over the years, the Court has assigned various functions to the due
process clause in the context of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In Pennoyer v. Neff,' 5 the Court found that the clause was in8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id at 289.
Id at 288.
Id at 290 (footnote omitted).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353 (1978).
World-'Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id at 297.
Id
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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tended to preserve:
[T]he authority of independent States, and the principles of
public law. . . applicable to them. One of these principles is,
that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory ...
The other principle of public law . . . follows from the one
mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and 6 authority over persons or property without its
territory.1
The historical reasons for that limitation on "the authority of independent states" seem to be inextricably entwined with the political
concept of national sovereignty and the procedural device of a writ of
capiasadrespondendum. The capias writ directed: "the sheriff to take
the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may have his body
before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in the action.
It notifies defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until security
for plaintiffs claim is furnished."' 7 It is not difficult to imagine the
degree of circumspection the capias writ imposed on an English law
court when an English plaintiff asked the Court to assert jurisdiction
over a cause of action against a French national. If an English sheriff
attempted to execute the writ in France by seizing the defendant and
effecting his presence in an English gaol, there to await trial or post
appropriate security to satisfy the plaintiff's asserted claim, France
might very well feel that its sovereign integrity had been violated.
Of course, in Pennoyer, the forum was Oregon, not England, and
the nonresident defendant resided in California, not France. Yet the
Court seemed gripped by the analogy between independent nationstates and "[tihe several States of the Union"'" which, though having
"many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them...
now vested in the government created by the Constitution,"' 9 remained, "except as restrained and limited by that instrument . . . independent states."2 0 The Court's analogy seems all the more strained
since, by the time Pennoyer was decided, the capias ad respondendum
was an anachronism, having been supplanted by simple service of pro16. Id at 722 (citations omitted).
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original). See Seidelson,
Sniadach,Fuentes, SubchapterII and Foreign Attachment, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 17 (1974).
18. 95 U.S. at 722.
19. Id
20. Id
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cess. 2 1 Still, Pennoyer did assign a "territorial sovereignty" function to

the due process clause.
By the time InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington22 was decided,
the Court had concluded that:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
inpersonam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff. . .But
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 23
In Hanson v. Denckla,24 the Court recognized that:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents
has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress
in communications and transportation has made the defense
of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to
these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer
* . . to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe. ....
2'
Then, surprisingly, Hanson resurrected the "territorial sovereignty"
function for due process noted in Pennoyer: "Those restrictions [on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States." 26 And, in the very next sentence, Hanson effected an awkward
wedding of "territorial sovereignty" with InternationalShoe: "However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimum
contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power
21. See Levy, Mesne Processin Personal.4ctionsat Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 52, 68 & n.75, 69 n.84, 97 (1968).
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Id at 316 (citations omitted).
24. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
25. Id at 250-51 (citations omitted).
26. Id at 251.
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"27
over him. See InternationalShoe ...
Nearly twenty years later, Shaffer v. Heitner28 seemed to reinter
"territorial sovereignty":
Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty
of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, [is] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.

Nothing in Hanson v. Denckla . . . is to the contrary.
The Hanson Court's statement that restrictions on state jurisdiction "are a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States," . . . simply makes the point
that the States are defined by their geographical territory. After making this point, the Court in Hanson determined that
the defendant over which personal jurisdiction was claimed
had not committed any acts sufficiently connected to the State
to justify jurisdiction under the InternationalShoe standard. 9
Finally, however, World-Wide Volkswagen3 0 once again disinterred "territorial sovereignty":
The concept of minimum contacts. . . can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
[T]he Framers. . . intended that the States retain many
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty
of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty
of all its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3
27. Id (citations omitted).
28.
29.
30.
31.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Id at 204 & n.20 (footnote and citations omitted).
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id at 291-92, 293. Justice White, author of the Court's opinion in World-Wide Volk-

swagen, has subsequently cast some doubt on the independent significance of the "territorial sovereignty" function of the due process clause. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), Justice White, writing for the Court, concluded that:
"The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Id at 702. Justice White also remarked that:

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss1/1

8

Seidelson: Recasting World-Wide Volkswagen As a Source of Longer Jurisdictio

1983]

RECASTING WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN

Why did the Court in World- Wide Volkswagen find it necessary to re-

vive "territorial sovereignty," probably anachronistic when Pennoyer
was decided and apparently so labeled by InternationalShoe? Why,

especially, since the primary rationale of World-Wide Volkswagen
seems to be the protection of the nonresident defendant from jurisdictional surprise, rather than the protection of the sovereign integrity of

New York? I think I may know the answer.
Were the due process clause said to perform only the function of

protecting the nonresident defendant "against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum," two conclusions would almost im-

mediately follow: (1) "progress in communications and transportation
32
has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome,"

and (2) aforum non conveniens motion to dismiss or a section 1404(a)
motion to transfer 33 goes more directly to the remaining "burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum" 34 than does the due process clause. Consequently, absent "territorial sovereignty," the due
process clause would appear to have little or no role in the jurisdic-

tional context. Apparently, the Court was unwilling to cede the basis
for its role as constitutional arbiter in determining the extent to which a

state may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. So the
Court retained "territorial sovereignty" to maintain its due process
foundation for review, even though the basic rationale of World-Wide
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied
to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty
vis-a-vis other states. . . . World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson . . .
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.
Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction
requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
Id at 702-03 n.10.
That language, I believe, corroborates the conclusion in the text accompanying notes 32-35
infra, that the resurrection of the "territorial sovereignty" function in World-Wide Volkswagen
served only to preserve the Court's role as constitutional arbiter.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland was a diversity case in which jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendants was based on the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, The Court approved the district
court's imposition of the sanction of Rule 37(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to find jurisdiction based on the defendants' failure to comply with discovery orders directed to the defendants'
contacts with Pennsylvania. Id at 707-709.
32. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
34. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (1980).
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Volkswagen 35 seems to have been the protection of the nonresident de-

fendant from jurisdictional surprise. And it is that basic rationale that
may point the way to a jurisdictional reach greater than some may have
contemplated before World-Wide Volkswagen.
IV.

TRADITIONAL MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS

Since InternationalShoe,36 the minimum contacts test has been the

essential criterion for determining the propriety of an assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Since Shaffer,
that same test has been applicable to quasi in rem jurisdiction. And
under World-Wide Volkswagen,3 7 the minimum contacts test became
the manner of shielding the defendant from jurisdictional surprise. But

"minimum contacts" describes just one of several relationships that
may exist between nonresident defendant and forum state.
InternationalShoe implied the existence of three such relationships. The first might be characterized as a "pervasive presence." If a

nonresident defendant has a pervasive presence within the forum state,
the courts of that state may assert jurisdiction over the defendant as to
any cause of action, whether or not the action arises out of the defend-

ant's activities within the forum. 38 The second of those relationships
35. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
36. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
38. "[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state
were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted).
Perhaps the classic example of such a pervasive presence exists in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Defendant owned and had operated gold and silver mines
in the Philippine Islands. "Its operations there were completely halted during the occupation of
the Islands by the Japanese." Id at 447. Thereafter.
[T]he [company] president, who was also the general manager and principal stockholder
of the company, returned to his home in. . . Ohio. There he maintained an office in
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the company.
He kept there office files of the company. He carried on there correspondence relating to
the business of the company and to its employees. He drew and distributed there salary
checks on behalf of the company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of two
company secretaries who worked there with him. He used and maintained in. . . Ohio,
two active bank accounts carrying substantial balances of company funds. A bank in
• . .. Ohio . .. acted as transfer agent for the stock of the company. Several directors'
meetings were held at his office or home in [Ohio]. From that office he supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's properties in the Philippines and
he dispatched funds to cover purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus he
carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited
wartime activities of the company.
Id at 447-48.
The Court concluded that the due process clause did not prohibit an Ohio court from asserting
jurisdiction over the company in a cause of action not arising from the Ohio activities. Id at 448.
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could be characterized as "minimum contacts."3 9 If a nonresident defendant has only isolated or occasional contacts with the forum state,
the courts of that state may assert jurisdiction over the defendant only
as to causes of action arising out of those minimum contacts.40 The
third relationship would be one that is significantly less than a perva-

sive presence but somewhat more than minimum contacts. Given that
relationship, in what circumstances may state courts assert jurisdiction
over the defendant?
Unfortunately, InternationalShoe does not seem to provide a clear
answer. Here is one of the most lucid judicial responses to that elusive

problem which I have found:
Attempting to give specific content to the "fair play and sub-

stantial justice" formulation, Chief Justice Stone catalogued
cases involving out-of-state corporations. First, where the

corporation's in-state activity was "continuous and systematic" and that activity gave rise to the episode in suit, personal
jurisdiction unquestionably could be asserted. . . . International Shoe itself ranked in that category. Further, the com-

mission of "some single or occasional acts" in a state might be
sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit in the state
with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters
totally unrelated to the forum connections. . . . These categories, sometimes described by the label "specific jurisdiction," have comprised the area in which the most significant
development has occurred since InternationalShoe. "Longarm" statutes and rules reflect that development.4 1
39. See supra text accompanying note 23.
40. As one court stated:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within
a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.
326 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
41. Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp. (F.E.A.T.), 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (emphasis in original). In Donahue, wrongful death actions were brought against the carrier, F.E.A.T., whose flight from Hualien, Taiwan, to Taipei, Taiwan, crashed while landing at
Taipei. The decedents had been Connecticut domiciliaries, temporarily residing in Guam, and on
holiday in Taiwan. Id at 1033. Plaintiff commenced identical actions against F.E.A.T. in five
U.S. district courts: the District of Guam, the District of Hawaii, the Central District of California, the Southern District of New York, and the District of Columbia. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1982), the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered all five actions consolidated
for pretrial proceedings in the District of Columbia. Id at 1034.
The court concluded that due process precluded the assertion ofjurisdiction by any of the five
courts because the actions asserted had not arisen out of any activities of defendant in any of the
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I believe that judicial language portrays an accurate assessment of the
traditional view of InternationalShoe, as read by courts and legislatures. Under the traditional view, when a nonresident defendant has
had only minimum contacts with the forum state or contacts somewhat
more than minimum, but significantly less than a pervasive presence,
the courts of the forum may assert jurisdiction over the defendant only
as to causes of action arising out of those contacts.
Even after World-Wide Volkswagen, courts have been assiduous in
noting with regard to nonresident defendants having significant contacts with the forum that the cause of action arose out of those contacts.
For example, in Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH,4 z plaintiff, a Kentucky

resident, was rendered a paraplegic as the result of a bullet wound in43
flicted by an Erma manufactured .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol.
To recover for his injury, plaintiff sued Erma, a German manufacturer
of firearms' and L.A. Distributors, Inc. (L.A.), a New York based distributor of Erma products.45 Finding that the Kentucky long-arm statfive jurisdictions, and the defendant lacked a pervasive presence in any of the jurisdictions which
would justify hearing actions unrelated to defendant's in-forum activities.
The court's assertion that "'Long-arm' statutes. . . reflect [the conclusion that specific jurisdiction is the area in which the most significant development had occurred since International
Shoe,]" is precisely correct. Id at 1036. Almost without exception, "comprehensive detailed statutes," require that the cause of action asserted arise out of nonresident defendant's in-forum activities. E. SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 145 (2d ed.
1972). See, e.g., UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A.
466 (1962), which, after enumerating those in-forum activities that make defendant vulnerable to
jurisdiction, requires that: "When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only
a [cause of action] arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him." Id
No similar inhibiting statutory language appears in the more general, and, therefore, potentially
broader, long-arm statutes: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973).
A certain awkwardness may arise in those instances where a state has enacted a detailed longarm statute and the state's appellate court concludes that the statute was intended to afford jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution. In Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc.,
249 Pa. Super. 392, 378 A.2d 351 (1977), allocaturrefused, the court, finding that the state's longarm statute provided for jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the extent permitted by the
Constitution, approved jurisdiction over a cause of action not arising out of the foreign corporation's in-forum activities. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73.
The current Pennsylvania long-arm statute, unlike the statute under which Garfield was decided, although purporting to afford jurisdiction over foreign corporations "to the fullest extent
allowed under the Constitution of the United States," also requires that the cause of action arise
our of the foreign corporation's "minimum contact with this Commonwealth." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5322 (Purdon 1981). Presumably, Gaifield would be decided differently today, not
because of the due process clause, but because of the more inhibiting statute.
42. 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
43. Id at 1187.
44. Id
45. Id
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ute was "to be interpreted as coextensive with the outer limits of due
process,"4 6 the court examined the constitutional propriety of asserting
jurisdiction over the manufacturer, Erma. The court found that Erma
and L.A., "the sole United States distributor for Erma,"4 had made
significant efforts to promote Erma's products "throughout the United
States."4 8 In addition to "conduct[ing] nationwide advertising," 4 9 L.A.
"[sold] to a distributor in Lexington, Kentucky, [and had] a salesman in
Tennessee and a warehouse in North Carolina, all capable of selling to
or servicing customers in Kentucky."5 Moreover, with Erma's knowledge, L.A. "solicted business in Kentucky through telephone calls and
mail order catalogues." 5 1 Clearly, Erma, through its distributor, had
significant contacts with Kentucky. The essence of the jurisdictional
issue, as identified by the court, then became:
Did this cause of action arise from Erma's activities in
Kentucky? The pistol admittedly was manufactured by
Erma. [In] its brief, Erma asserts that the firearm was sold by
L.A. to Stewart Bear of Nashville, Tennessee, which was the
last sale reflected by the record, although the firearm was
owned by Lee Dyer of Paducah, Kentucky, at the time of
[plaintitts] injury. The brief
then asks "Query: Where and
52
from whom did he buy it?"
The obvious implication of the "query" is that, notwithstanding Erma's
significant contacts with Kentucky, jurisdiction over Erma would be
permissible only if plaintiffs cause of action arose out of those contacts.
The court found that it did:
What Erma has failed to mention is that Stewart Bear of
Nashville, Tennessee, is a salesman for L.A., employed on a
commission basis. In light of the relationship between Erma
and L.A. and between L.A. and Stewart Bear, we find it more
probable than not that this cause of action arose from Erma's
activities in Kentucky.53
Apparently, the court considered that conclusion necessary to justify
the assertion of jurisdiction.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id at 1189.
Id at 1191.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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In Oswalt v. Scri4o, Inc. ,s" plaintiff, a resident of Texas, was in-

jured by an alleged malfunction of a cigarette lighter manufactured in
Japan by defendant Tokai-Seiki. Pursuant to a contract with the manufacturer, Tokai-Seiki, Scripto was "the exclusive distributor of the
• . . lighter in the United States."5 5 Prior to Mrs. Oswalt's injury,
Scripto had "purchased several million of the lighters and had placed
them in commerce for sale to the public in the United States." 6
The court perceived that the issue was whether Tokai-Seiki had
"reason to know or expect that the . . . lighter would reach Texas." 57
The court answered the issue affirmatively. After citing World-Wide
Volkswagen, the court noted:

Tokai-Seiki delivered millions of the lighters to Scripto with
the understanding that Scripto would be the exclusive distributor for the United States and that Scripto would be selling
the lighters to a customer with national retail outlets. There is
nothing in this record to indicate that Tokai-Seiki attempted
in any way to limit the states to which the lighters could be
sold. To the contrary, the record shows that Tokai-Seiki had
every reason to believe its product would be sold to a nationwide market, that is, in any or all states. Moreover, the record
shows that Texas was one of the states in which the lighters
were in fact marketed, the distribution chain including a
Texas wholesaler [Southwestern Drug Corporation], and a
Texas retail store [Mr. Oswalt's drug store]. 58
The ultimate issue then became whether the cause of action asserted
arose out of Tokai-Seiki's contacts with Texas. The court found that it
did: "Mr. Oswalt, who owns a drug store [in Texas], purchased 12 or
14 of the lighters on a display card from Southwestern. . . , a wholesale supplier in Midland, Texas. Mrs. Oswalt got the lighter which injured her from this display card."59 Clearly, the nonresident defendant
54. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. Id at 197.
56. Id
57. Id at 198.
58. Id at 199-200.
59. Id at 198. Oswalt's finding that plaintifis cause of action arose out of nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum may have been required by then existing decisions of the
Supreme Court of Texas interpreting that state's long-arm statute. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966). Subsequently, however, that court concluded that the Texas long-arm
statute was intended to achieve the maximum jurisdictional reach permissible under due process,
and that the due process clause did not invariably require that the cause of action asserted arise
out of defendant's forum contacts. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638
S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983). Hall,in turn, has required the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to amend its method of determining the permissible reach of
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had utilized a distributive chain which would foreseeably place its
products in the forum state and the cause of action arose out of those
forum contacts.
In the course of its opinion in Oswalt, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit cited Gray v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. ,60 and noted that Gray had been "cited favorably by the
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen."61 Because Gray has become a Conflicts staple, treated in casebooks and treatises,62 it may be
helpful to consider it here.
The plaintiff, Phyllis Gray, was injured when a water heater she
had purchased in Illinois exploded in her home. To recover for her
injuries, plaintiff sued, among others, the Titan Valve Manufacturing
Co. (Titan), alleging that Titan had negligently manufactured the
heater's safety valve. Titan had manufactured the valve in Ohio. The
valve was then incorporated in the water heater by American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp. in Pennsylvania. The court noted:

[Titan's] only contact with [Illinois, the forum,] is found in the
fact that a product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated in
Pennsylvania, into a hot water heater which in the course of
commerce was sold to an Illinois consumer. The record fails
to disclose whether [Titan] has done any other business in Illinois, either directly or indirectly .... 63
Titan challenged the jurisdiction of the Illinois court. The
Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that the state's long-arm statute
"contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to the extent permitted by the due-process clause,, 64 and applied the
due process constitutional test. First, the court found that "it is a reasonable inference that [Titan's] commercial transactions, like those of
other manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this
jurisdiction thereunder when the court hears diversity cases initiated pursuant to the Texas longarm statute. Compare Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981), with Placid Investments, Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1982).
60. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
61. 616 F.2d at 201-02.
62. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONs 560, 561, 564, 565 (1981); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, 61 n.12,
80, 83 n.15 (1968); J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS 497 (1978); W. REESE
& M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 99, 106, 109 (7th ed. 1978); E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 211 n.6, 296, 309 n.1 1,333, 338, 339 (1982); E. SCOLES & R.
WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 145 (2d ed. 1972); R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159, 161 (2d ed. 1980).

63. Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
64. Id at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763 (citation omitted).
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State. ' 65 From that inference, the court concluded that:
To the extent that [Titan's] business may be directly affected
by transactions occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws
of this State, and it has undoubtedly benefited, to a degree,
from the protection which our law has given to the marketing
of hot water heaters containing its valves.66
The court went on to note that "[w]here the alleged liability arises,
as in this case, from the manufacture of products presumably sold in
contemplation of use here, it should not matter that the purchase was
made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the
defendant shipped the product into this State. ' ' 67 Thus, Titan had utilized a distributive chain which it knew or should have known would
take its products into the forum state and the plaintiffs cause of action
arose out of those forum contacts. Consequently, the court concluded
that the assertion of jurisdiction over Titan was constitutionally
permissible.

V.

THE EFFECT OF WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN

In the pre-World-Wide Volkswagen case of Gray, and the postWorld-Wide cases of Poyner and Oswalt, the respective courts concluded that the nonresident defendant had significant contacts with the
forum and that the plaintiffs cause of action arose out of those contacts. Thus, each of these cases represents a traditional application of
InternationalShoe. If the court in any of the cases had found that
plaintiff's cause of action had not arisen out of those contacts, although
defendant had significant contacts with the forum, the same traditional
application of InternationalShoe presumably would have precluded
jurisdiction.
In Poyner, for example, if the court had found that the Kentucky
plaintiff's injury had been inflicted by an Erma pistol sold to a Tennessee consumer and taken by that consumer into Kentucky, the court
would have concluded that the cause of action had not arisen out of
Erma's contacts with Kentucky. In Oswalt, if the court had found that
the lighter which injured the Texas plaintiff had been sold to a consumer in Oklahoma and been taken by the consumer into Texas, the
court would have concluded that the cause of action had not arisen out
65. Id at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
66. Id
67. Id
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of the manufacturer's contacts with Texas. Finally, in Gray, if the
court had found that the plaintiff had purchased the water heater in
Indiana and transported it to her Illinois home, the court would have
concluded that the cause of action had not arisen out of the manufacturer Titan's contacts with Illinois. In each instance, the hypothetical
conclusion that (1) the nonresident defendant had significant contacts
with the forum, but that (2) the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
out of those contacts, coupled with the traditional application of International Shoe, would seem to preclude jurisdiction. The question is
whether the same results would be required by World-Wide
Volkswagen.
Even before the Supreme Court decided World-Wide Volkswagen,
some courts had evidenced a more adventuresome spirit regarding jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Consider Garfieldv. Homowack
Lodge, Inc.6 In Garfield, the defendant, a New York corporation, operated a resort in the state of New York. Defendant advertised its resort in a Philadelphia newspaper, provided a toll-free phone number in
Philadelphia, and paid a ten percent fee to travel agents in Philadelphia
through whom clients came to the New York resort. Obviously, defendant sought patrons from the Philadelphia area. Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, was injured "when he fell on [an allegedly] defectively
maintained ice skating rink at [defendant's] resort ... ."69 However,
the record gave no indication that plaintiff had read the newspaper ads,
booked reservations through a Philadelphia travel agency, or used the
toll-free telephone number to secure accommodations. In other words,
there was no factual basis supporting a contention that the cause of
action arose from defendant's activities within Pennsylvania.7" To recover for his injuries, plaintiff sued defendant in a Pennsylvania state
court. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in a 4-3 decision, approved
the assertion of jurisdiction.7
Both the majority and minority opinions recognized that the jurisdictional issue centered on the fact that, although the nonresident defendant had contacts with the forum state, the cause of action did not
arise out of those contacts. The majority found the absence of a connection between defendant's contacts and the cause of action did not
destroy jurisdiction because the state's long-arm statute provided for
68.
69.
70.
71.

249 Pa. Super. 392, 378 A.2d 351 (1977), allocatur refused.
Id at 394, 378 A.2d at 353.
Id at 402-03, 378 A.2d at 357 (footnote omitted) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
249 Pa. Super. 392, 378 A.2d 351 (1977), allocaturrefused.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 1
TULSA LAW JOURNVAL

[Vol. 19:1

jurisdiction over foreign corporations "to the fullest extent allowable
under the Constitution of the United States,"7 2 and "defendant's
method of soliciting business in Pennsylvania consisted of such substantial and continuous activities in this Commonwealth as to render it
amenable to inpersonam jurisdiction."7' 3 In support of the latter conclusion, the majority quoted this language from InternationalShoe:
"There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 74 Apparently, the majority relied
on the "intensity"7 5 of defendant's activities in the forum state and
found that the defendant had a pervasive presence in the forum. The
minority contrasted the case with Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co. ,76 the classic example of a pervasive presence, and found that
the defendant corporation had no pervasive presence in the forum, and
that, since the cause of action had not arisen from defendant's contacts
with the forum, due process precluded the assertion of jurisdiction.
It seems to me that, under then existing decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the dissent was right and the majority
wrong. Notwithstanding the "intensity" of the defendant's activities
aimed at securing Pennsylvania patrons, it would seem fairly clear that
the defendant had not established such a pervasive presence in Pennsylvania that the courts of that state could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the defendant as to any and all causes of action. Since the
cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's contacts with the
forum, jurisdiction would seem to have been constitutionally
impermissible.
But now consider World-Wide Volkswagen's primary rationale:
the due process clause is intended to protect the nonresident defendant
from jurisdictional surprise. Would the assertion of jurisdiction approved in Ganfeld come as a due process surprise to the defendant? Of
course not. Even though the cause of action asserted did not arise out
of the defendant's contacts with the forum, it was precisely the kind of
72. Id at 396, 378 A.2d at 354 (quoting Act of November 15, 1972, PA. CoNS.

§ 8309(b) in footnote 4) (currently a modified statutory version exists in 42 PA.

STAT.

CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 5322(b) (Purdon 1981)).
73. 249 Pa. Super. at 398, 378 A.2d at 354.
74. Id at 397, 378 A.2d at 354 (quoting InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (citations
omitted).
75. 249 Pa. Super. at 398, 378 A.2d at 354.
76. 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see supra note 38.
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action the defendant should have contemplated as a result of those contacts. And that is where I think World-Wide Volkswagen points the
way to a greater jurisdictional reach than some may have anticipated.
If a nonresident defendant has contacts with the forum state somewhat
more significant than minimal," though clearly not enough to establish
a pervasive presence, and if the cause of action asserted is of the kind
that defendant should have contemplated as a result of his contacts
with the forum, though not arising out of defendant's actual contacts
with the forum, the assertion of jurisdiction would hardly come as a
surprise. Therefore, since the principal rationale of World-Wide
Volkswagen would be satisfied, jurisdiction would seem to be consistent with due process.7 8
77. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251.
78. Apparently, that potential for extending jurisdictional reach has eluded the Pennsylvania
Superior Court. In Goff v. Armbrecht Motor Truck Sales, Inc., 284 Pa. Super. 544, 426 A.2d 628
(1980), defendant, an Ohio corporation that sold automobiles, sold a Jeep to the plaintiff, an Ohio
resident. While riding in the Jeep as a passenger, the plaintiff sustained severe and permanent
injuries when the Jeep went out of control and crashed into a guardrail in Pennsylvania. Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court. Citing World-Wide Volkswagen, the
court concluded that the mere fact that plaintiff's use of the vehicle in Pennsylvania may have
been reasonably foreseeable was not sufficient justification to subject defendant to jurisdiction.
However, the court then noted defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania, which included: (1) For
thirty-six years, defendant had been listed in the Driver's Directory of GMC Truck Dealers, which
was distributed in Pennsylvania; (2) Defendant occasionally advertised in an Ohio newspaper
which may have had Pennsylvania readers; (3) Defendant occasionally advertised on two Ohio
radio stations which may have had Pennsylvania listeners; (4) Defendant had sold vehicles to
Pennsylvania residents; (5) Defendant had sold parts and accessories to Pennsylvania residents;
(6) Perhaps ten times a year, defendant sent officers into Pennsylvania for the purpose of securing
notary service for titles in connection with sales of vehicles to Pennsylvania residents.
Those contacts led the court to conclude that defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting within Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, the court found that jurisdiction was inappropriate because plaintiff's cause of action had not arisen out of defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania, but remanded the case for determining the extent of the defendant's activities in
Pennsylvania. I would have thought that, given nonresident defendant's forum contacts, the court
would have concluded that first, defendant's primary conduct had made the use of vehicles sold by
it reasonably foreseeable in Pennsylvania; second, therefore injury from such use in Pennsylvania
was reasonably foreseeable; third, thus the cause of action asserted was of the type which defendant should have contemplated as a result of its own conduct; and fourth, consequently the assertion of jurisdiction would not have come as a surprise to defendant, even though the action
asserted had not arisen out of defendant's forum contacts.
It is true that the plaintiff, like the defendant, was a nonresident of the forum state. That fact,
however, would seem to effect no significant difference in the conclusion that the action asserted
was of the type the defendant should have contemplated in Pennsylvania as a result of the defendant's own conduct. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, like the retail dealer and regional
distributor, were nonresidents of Oklahoma. See supra text accompanying notes 5-15. However,
had the dealer's and distributor's primary conduct-for example, advertising their automobiles in
Oklahoma and selling their automobiles to Oklahoma residents-made the use of their Audis and
subsequent injury from that use in Oklahoma foreseeable, the action brought by the Robinsons in
Oklahoma would have come as no jurisdictional surprise to dealer or distributor. Thus, the primary rationale of World-Wide Volkswagen, and, presumably, the due process clause, would have
been satisfied.
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The same approach can be applied to a case that has been characterized as "exceeding the permissible limits" 79 of jurisdiction. In Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , a Beech manufactured airplane crashed
79. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 308 n.5 (1982). Immediately after the excerpt
quoted in this text, the authors noted:
[Tihe theory of products liability assumes that a manufacturer benefits from a system of
economic distribution in which the product is released into the channels of commerce
without regard to control by the manufacturer, and since the second-hand or used plane
market may be important in supporting the manufacturer's initial market, it may be that
the liability of the manufacturer follows the product, both with regard to substance and
to jurisdiction, but that the manufacturer should not be required to respond in ajurisdiction in which the only significant contact is the residence of the plaintiff. Cf. Poyner v.
Erma Werke Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id
To the extent that that language implies that the manufacturer's vulnerability to jurisdiction
should be as broad as the market enjoyed by the manufacturer's product, I would concur. In
O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963), a product liability action was
brought by Vermont residents injured by the ingestion of glass contained in a can of beans prepared and packed by defendant in New York and purchased by plaintiffs in Vermont. The court
denied jurisdiction because the record did not demonstrate an "intentional and affirmative action
on the part of the non-resident defendant in pursuit of its corporate purposes within [Vermont]."
Id at 464, 194 A.2d at 570. My critical reaction to that decision was this:
In O'Brien, the Vermont court was unwilling to conclude that defendant's can of
beans had come to be purchased in [Vermont] through some intentional act of defendant. It may be helpful to attempt to determine some of the various ways in which the
beans came to be purchased there. Several possibilities exist: defendant made its beans
available to an exclusive distributor in Vermont; defendant made its beans available to a
number of distributors in Vermont; defendant made its beans available to a distributor
in New England (outside Vermont), who in turn made them available to wholesalers in
Vermont; defendant made its beans available to one or more distributors in New York,
who in turn made them available to wholesalers in Vermont; defendant made its beans
available directly to a retail outlet in Vermont; or defendant made its beans available
directly to plaintiffs. Whichever of these possibilities existed in fact, it seems fair to
conclude that defendant benefited from the purchase of its can of beans in Vermont since
such- purchase potentially enlarged defendant's profitable manufacturing capacity,
Moreover, it would seem appropriate to infer that defendant intended to acquire such
benefit.
Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the LongArm Statutes, 6 DuQ. L. REv.221, 228 (1968) (footnote omitted).
I am not certain how the Supreme Court would react to O'Brien. To my suggestion that a
defendant's vulnerability to jurisdiction should be congruent with the market enjoyed by defendant's product, World- Wide Volkswagen may be read as implying a negative response by rejecting
the concept that "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service
of process." 444 U.S. at 296. Yet, regardless of which possibility was ultimately utilized by the
defendant in O'Brien to effect a distributive chain which made the consumption of its beans in
Vermont entirely foreseeable, the defendant, by its own conduct, "should reasonably [have] anticipate[d] being haled into court [in Vermont]." 444 U.S. at 297.
In O'Brien, the plaintiffs' amended complaint, alleged that, after the beans were packed in
New York, the defendant sold the beans to International Grocers Alliance for resale and distribution to grocers in Vermont and other states. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 159,
212 A.2d 69, 70 (1965). The court deemed this conduct was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement. Id at 162, 212 A.2d at 72.
For a discussion of Poyner, cited by SCOLFS & HAY, supra this note, see supra text accompanying note 42.
80. 72 Ill. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d 252 (1978), apff'ng, 51 Ill. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1977),
cert. denied, 442 US. 928 (1979).
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as it approached an airport near Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories,
Canada."' All three pilots on board were killed. Two of the pilots and
their dependent survivors were Illinois residents. The dependent survivors brought wrongful death actions against Beech in an Illinois state
court: 2 Beech is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Kansas, where the plane had been manufactured. In 1966
Beech sold the Kansas-manufactured aircraft to a Texas corporation.
In 1968 the Texas corporation sold the plane to a Nevada company. In
1971 the Nevada company sold the aircraft to an Illinois corporation.
After being based in Illinois for some time, the aircraft was apparently
sold by the Illinois corporation to Eagle Aircraft Services, Ltd., of
London, England. At the time of the crash, it was being flown from
Illinois to London. 3 At all material times, Beech had a "contractual
relationship with .

.

. a distributor of [Beech's] products .

.

. in

4

Illinois."
Beech challenged the jurisdiction of the Illinois state court. A divided Appellate Court of Illinois, with both of the majority judges applying different reasoning, found that jurisdiction was appropriate."
The lead opinion concluded that Beech had committed a "tortious
act" 6 in Illinois "by the delivery into Illinois of a plane that was allegedly unreasonably dangerous. 8 7 Of course, Beech had not effected that
delivery. The author of the lead opinion found that Beech had "minimum contacts"88 with Illinois apparently because of "the contact that
decedents had with the plane. '8 9 Clearly, this
the plaintiffs and their
"unilateral activity" 90 by the forum residents was not attributable to
Beech. The concurring opinion approved jurisdiction because it found
that Beech's relations with the Illinois distributor of Beech planes constituted a sufficiently "pervasive"'" presence to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction "over a cause [of action] not directly related to [those] ac81. 72 Ill. 2d at 550, 382 N.E.2d at 253.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id
id at 551, 382 N.E.2d at 253.
Id
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 Ill. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1977).
Id at 298, 367 N.E.2d at 122.
Id at 301, 367 N.E.2d at 122.
Id at 301, 367 N.E.2d at 123.

89. Id
90. "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958).
91. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 306, 367 N.E.2d at 126 (Stamos, J., concurring).
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So far as I know, the concurring opinion is unique in its

conclusion that the existence of an in-forum product distributor consti-

tutes a pervasive presence by the product manufacturer. The dissenting

opinion concluded that Beech had not commited a "tortious act"93 , in
Illinois, that there was not "sufficient minimum contact to meet due
process requirements," 94 and that Beech did not have a "pervasive" 9
presence that would justify jurisdiction over "a cause of action not related to Beech's alleged Illinois activities." 9 6
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the finding of jurisdiction.9 7 The court's rationale is difficult to ascertain. First the court
noted that:

From the agreed statement of facts it does not appear that
plaintiffs' causes of action arose from any act of defendant's
[Illinois] distributor, . . . or that the relationship between
[the distributor] and defendant was in any manner connected
with the occurrence in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed;
nor does it appear that plaintiffs' causes of action arose from
"the transaction of any business within this State."'9 8
But the court concluded that defendant's activities rendered it "present
and doing business in Illinois." 99
Both sections cited by the court deal with the mechanics of effecting service on a "private corporation"' t °0 or "any party"'' t vulnerable

to jurisdiction. Although the court relied on both sections, neither pur92. Id The more typical judicial reaction to a nonresident defendant's having a product
distributor within the forum state, is to find jurisdiction as to causes of action arising out of inforum sales by the distributor. See Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332
F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1964).
93. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 308, 367 N.E.2d at 127 (Downing, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 310, 367 N.E.2d at 129.
95. Id at 312, 367 N.E.2d at 130.
96. Id
97. Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 72 I11. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d 252 (1978).
98. Id at 557, 382 N.E.2d at 256 (citation omitted).
99. Id at 539-40, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
100. Section 13.3 provided that:
A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its
registered agent or any officer or agent of said corporation found anywhere in the State;
or (2) in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law. A private corporation
may also be notified by publication and mail in like manner and with like effect as
individuals.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.3 Civ. Prac. Act (Smith-Hurd 1968) (repealed 1981 (effective July 1,
1982)) (superseded by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-204 Code Civ. Proc. (Smith-Hurd 1983)).
I01. Section 16 provided that:
Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the State. If
upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of
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ports to define or describe that conduct which makes a party vulnerable

to such jurisdiction. For our purpose, perhaps the most significant language in the court's opinion was this:
In view of defendant's activities within Illinois designed to effect sales to residents of Illinois, defendant could reasonably
assume that airplanes which it manufactured would be owned
by residents of Illinois and in view of the high degree of mobility peculiar to its products could further assume that they

would be flown both within Illinois and into other States, or

as in this instance, to other countries. We hold, therefore, that

...defendant's activities show sufficient contacts with this
State so that requiring it to defend this action does not offend

"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."1

2

Was the result achieved in Brabandconstitutionally permissible? If the
answer were based on Court decisions available when Brabandwas decided, I think not. It seems fairly clear that Beech's having a distributor within Illinois would not be deemed by the Court such a pervasive

presence within the forum as to justify jurisdiction over actions wholly
unrelated to that relationship. It seems equally clear that the actions
asserted were wholly unrelated to Beech's contacts with the forum.
Therefore, under the tests of InternationalShoe as traditionally applied, due process would seem to preclude jurisdiction. But what about
World-Wide Volkswagen?
In Braband, as in World-Wide Volkswagen, the nonresident de-

fendant's injury-causing product was not in the forum as the result of
any primary conduct of the defendant. Rather, the product's presence

in the forum was attributable to the intervening conduct of the user, or
summons within this State; otherwise it shall have the force and effect of service by
publication.
The service of summons shall be m.de in like manner as service within this State, by
any person over 18 years of age not a party to the action. No order of court is required.
An affidavit of the server shall be filed slating the time, manner and place of service. The
court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent proofs, in determining whether
service has been properly made.
No default shall be entered until the expiration of at least 30 days after service. A
default judgment rendered on such ser ice may be set aside only on a showing which
would be timely and sufficient to set tside a default judgment rendered on personal
service within this State.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 Civ. Prac. Act (Smith-Hurd 1968, as amended 1977) (repealed 1981
(effective July 1, 1982)) (superseded by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-208 Code Civ. Proc. (SmithHurd 1983)).
2d at 559, 382 N.E.2d at 257. For a more recent Illinois case in which nonresident
102. 72 Ill.
defendant may have had significant contact, with the forum, but the cause of action asserted was
not of the kind reasonably foreseeable as a result of those contacts, see Cook Associates, Inc. v.
Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill. 2d 190, 42q N.E.2d 847 (1981).
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a series of consecutive users. Still, there remains this factual distinction
between the two cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the nonresident
defendants had done nothing to introduce their products into
Oklahoma. In Braband, however, Beech regularly sought to sell its
products through an Illinois distributor. The question is whether this
distinction is of constitutional significance. Under World-Wide Volkswagen, I believe the answer is yes. By seeking to market its aircraft in
Illinois, Beech, through its own conduct, made the use of its planes by
Illinois residents entirely foreseeable. That same conduct made it foreseeable that Illinois residents, injured in their use of Beech's planes,
would sue Beech in Illinois, even though the actual in-flight injury may
have occurred outside Illinois. And, of course, that is exactly the type
of actions that were asserted against Beech in Braband. Illinois residents, injured by the use of a Beech plane, sued Beech in Illinois. It
would seem that subjecting Beech to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court
would not come as a surprise to Beech, since the actions asserted were
of the kind Beech should have contemplated as a result of its contacts
with Illinois, even though the actions asserted had not arisen out of
those contacts. It is true, of course, that the injury-producing plane in
Braband had passed through the hands of a number of owners before
the fatal crash. That fact, however, would seem to go more to a possible substantive law defense t0 3 than to a jurisdictional bar under WorldWide Volkswagen. I am inclined to believe, therefore, that Braband,
perhaps unconstitutional when decided, has been "ratified" by WorldWide Volkswagen and its primary rationale that the due process clause
is intended to protect nonresident defendants from jurisdictional
surprise.
What about the hypothetical spin-offs of Poyner, Oswalt and
Gray? In each instance, the nonresident defendant had significant contacts with the forum state. Each defendant utilized a distributive chain
which it knew, or should have known, would place its products within
the forum. In each case, the cause of action asserted was of the kind
that defendant should have contemplated as a result of its own primary
conduct. The plaintiff in Poyner was injured in Kentucky by a gun
103. It is possible that, given the series of owners prior to the fatal crash, the plane may have
undergone substantial, noncontemplatable changes after leaving Beech's hands.
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the

user or consumer

. . .

is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the

ultimate user or consumer. . . if... it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965).
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manufactured by the defendant, in circumstances in which the defendant's own conduct had made such injuries foreseeable. In Oswalt, the
plaintiff was injured in Texas by a lighter manufactured by the defendant, in circumstances in which the defendant's own conduct had made
such injuries foreseeable. Finally, in Gray, the plaintiff sustained injury in Illinois as the result of a malfunctioning safety valve manufactured by the defendant, in circumstances in which the defendant's own
conduct had made such injuries foreseeable. Even assuming that the
gun in Poyner had been carried into Kentucky by a Tennessee consumer, that the lighter in Oswalt had been carried into Texas by an
Oklahoma consumer, and that the water heater in Gray had been
purchased in Indiana, the causes of action asserted would have been of
the type foreseeable to the nonresident defendants as a consequence of
their own conduct. None would have come as a jurisdictional surprise
to the defendant. Under World-Wide Volkswagen, then, none of the
actions would be precluded because of lack of jurisdiction, even though
the cause of action had not arisen out of defendant's contacts with the
forum.
VI.

ILLUSTRATIONS

A hypothetical situation can now be fashioned to further test that
conclusion. Suppose defendant, a State A corporation, manufactures
helicopters. It sells its total output to a State B distributor, which distributes the helicopters to retail dealers in State B and State C. XYZ, a
radio station operator in State B, purchased a helicopter manufactured
by defendant from a retail dealer in State B. XYZ used the helicopter
to provide its listeners with rush-hour traffic reports. An employee of
XYZ regularly piloted the helicopter over the station's service area in
State B and State C. During one of those flights, the helicopter crashed
in State C, killing a State C resident. Decedent's widow brings a
wrongful death action against defendant in a State C court, alleging
that the helicopter was defective and unreasonably dangerous when it
left defendant's hands. Now assume that State C's long-arm statute
permits jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the Constitution. Defendant enters a special appearance
to challenge the court's jurisdiction. How should the court rule?
Here, as in World-Wide Volkswagen, the injury-producing product
entered the forum state as the result of the intervening conduct of the
user, not as the result of primary conduct by the defendant. Presuma-
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bly, that intervening conduct, however reasonably foreseeable, would
be considered superseding for jurisdictional purposes. The fact that the

helicopter in this case may be even more mobile than the Audi in
World-Wide Volkswagen apparently would not change the superseding

character of the user's conduct. After all, as the Court noted in WorldWide Volkswagen, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process

analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into
the forum State."" Does that mean that the court should dismiss the
action? I think not. The hypothetical differs from World-Wide

Volkswagen in one critical respect. In the hypothetical, the defendant
utilized a distributive chain which it knew would take its products to

retail dealers in the forum state where the products would be offered
for sale to forum residents. Thus, as a result of the defendant's primary
conduct, the use of its products within the forum state, as well as injuries resulting from such use, were foreseeable. Consequently, actions
of the kind asserted in the instant case in State C were foreseeable to
the defendant as a result of its own primary conduct. And, as the Court
noted in World-Wide Volkswagen, the foreseeability that is critical to

due process analysis is present when:
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State

are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there. .

.

. The Due Process Clause, . . .gives a de-

gree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some min-

imum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit. 05

Since the assertion of jurisdiction by the State C court would come as
104. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
105. Id (citations omitted). The significance of that language, in terms of protecting the nonresident defendant from jurisdictional surprise, seems to have been recognized and applied differently by the Supreme Court of Oregon in two cases decided on the same day. In State ex tel
Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982), defendant, a New York
corporation, manufactured "servo actuators" in New York and sold them "to businesses for use as
component parts of other products." One of those parts was incorporated in an airplane engine
which, in turn, was incorporated in an airplane. Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) sold the
airplane to the plaintiff, an Oregon corporation, in Oregon. The plane crashed in California.
Plaintiff sued in Oregon. Defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction. Citing World.Wide Volk.
swagen, the court concluded that "fw]hat is relevant for due process is the foresecability of being
haled into the forum state's courts, and it is 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state'. . . that provides that expectation rather than any 'unilateral activity' of a plaintiff."
Id at -, 657 P.2d at 215 (citations omitted).
Applying that test, the court found that jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant's
activity generated "the expectation that its products ultimately will come to rest in every state."
Id at -, 657 P.2d at 215. That conclusion is wholly justified, I believe, by the rationale of World-
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no surprise to the defendant, World-Wide Volkswagen's primary consideration would seem to be satisfied and, with it, any due process
requirements.
How would our hypothetical have been resolved before WorldWide Volkswagen? It seems fairly clear that defendant's use of a distributive chain leading to retail dealers in State C would hardly be considered equivalent to a pervasive presence in that state. At most, the
Wide Volkswagen. Certainly, subjecting the defendant to suit in Oregon should not have come as
a jurisdictional surprise to the defendant.
In State ex rel. La Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin (Michelin France) v.
Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 207 (1982), defendant Michelin France manufactured tires in France.
It sold the tires to Michelin USA and Sears, Roebuck & Company. Plaintiff, an Oregon corporation, installed one of the defendant's tires on one of the plaintiff's trucks. The truck was damaged
when the tire exploded. "The place of purchase, installation and explosion of the tire which allegedly caused the accident were not specified in the complaint." Id at -, 657 P.2d at 208. In
addition, the plaintiff failed to indicate "the scope of Michelin USA's or Sears, Roebuck & Company's distribution of Michelin [France] products in the United States and that is not a matter of
which [the court] can take judicial notice." Id at -, 657 P.2d a 210. However, the court was
willing to conclude "that Michelin France has sought indirectly to serve the Oregon market
through a system of distribution by others which covers the United States." Id at -, 657 P.2d at
210. Nevertheless, the court found jurisdiction to be constitutionally precluded: "Here, unlike
Hydraulic Serv'ocontrols, no fact of substantive relevance, such as sale, use, accident or injury has
been shown to have occurred in Oregon." Id at -, 657 P.2d at 211.
That language, and the court's opinion, seem to require a specific minimum contact between
the nonresident defendant and the forum state "relevant" (id at 211) to the specific cause of action
asserted, even though nonresident defendant has utilized a distributive chain which makes the
presence of its product in the forum foreseeable. I do not believe that such an additional requirement is mandated by World-Wide Volkswagen, so long as the nonresident defendant's conduct
makes suits of the type asserted reasonably foreseeable in the forum state.
In Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia (Helicol), 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983), Helicol, a Colombian business firm, contracted with a Texas
consortium to transport workers and supplies to an oil pipeline construction site in Peru. The
contract was negotiated in Texas. A helicopter crash in Peru resulted in the deaths of four workers, all United States citizens but none domiciled in Texas. Id at 871. Wrongful death actions
were brought against Helicol in the Texas state court, where Helicol challenged jurisdiction. The
Texas Supreme Court approved the assertion of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Texas
long-arm statute was intended to reach as far as due process would permit. Given Helicors significant contacts with Texas, some related to the contract with the Texas consortium, some not, the
court concluded that due process did not require that the causes of action asserted arise out of
those contacts.
It is somewhat ironic that the Texas court utilized the Hall case to adopt the significant contacts test. Given the facts of the case, one could argue that the actions asserted had arisen out of
Helicors contacts with Texas and the contract with the Texas consortium. Moreover, the court's
opinion does not make it clear that the significant contacts test would justify jurisdiction only with
regard to actions of the kind made foreseeable in the forum as a result of those contacts. Helicol's
contacts with Texas did not make the use of Helicol's helicopter service in Texas foreseeable.
Rather, those contacts made the use of that service in Peru by workers domiciled in Texas or
elsewhere reasonably foreseeable. That, in turn, would seem to point to the conclusion that, since
the decedents had been employed by the Texas consortium, the wrongful death actions arose out
of Helicors contacts with Texas.
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corporation's in-state activity was "continuous and systematic,"'' 6 and
such activity would support "personal jurisdiction"' 7 only if "that activity gave rise to the episode in suit."' 18 In our hypothetical, that v)as
not the case. The injury-causing product had not been purchased from
a retail dealer in the forum. Apparently, then, jurisdiction would have
been unavailable since the cause of action asserted did not arise out of
the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum. It would seem
that, again, the primary rationale of World-Wide Volkswagen would
support a jurisdictional reach unavailable before that decision.
Now, amend the hypothetical slightly by replacing in personam
with quasi in rem jurisdiction. This can be accomplished by assuming
that the plaintiff initiated the wrongful death action by attaching a
bank account of the defendant in State C, and that State C's foreign
attachment statute permits jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowable
by the Constitution. Under Shaffer v. Heitner,"9 the same due process
test applicable to in personam jurisdiction is also applicable to quasi in
rem jurisdiction. Presumably, that would include the Court's latest formulation of that test in World-Wide Volkswagen. Indeed, Shaffer said,
"We. . . conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be

evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and
its progeny."' 10 Consequently, though such quasi in rem jurisdiction
probably would have been unavailable when Shaffer was decided, because the cause of action did not arise out of defendant's contacts with
the forum, such jurisdiction would be available today under WorldWide Volkswagen.

Would that quasi in rem jurisdiction be available even though
there is no relationship between the res attached--defendant's bank account in the forum state-and the wrongful death action asserted? I
think the answer is yes. It is true that Shaffer indicated:
the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence
of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State,
the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims
to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
106. Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981): see
supra note 41.
107. Donahue, 652 F.2d at 1036.
108. Id
109. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
110. Id at 212 (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's claim to property
located in the State would normally indicate that he expected
to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. 1 1
But Shaffer also demonstrates that due process may be satisfied even
absent a relationship between the res attached and the cause of action
asserted if "other ties"' 12 exist. Those other ties may be found in "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."1 13 In
the hypothetical, the defendant, by utilizing retail distributors in the
forum state, generated contacts with the forum that are more than minimal, though less than a pervasive presence. By its primary conduct,
the defendant made personal injury and wrongful death actions arising
out of its products' use reasonably foreseeable in the forum. The
wrongful death action asserted would fall within the kind of forum actions reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's primary conduct. Under World-Wide Volkswagen, that would seem to justify in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant; under Shaffer, that same due
process test would seem to justify quasi in rem jurisdiction.
VII.

CONCLUSION

World-Wide Volkswagen would appear to be something of a paradox. By rejecting as a basis for jurisdiction the reasonably foreseeable
presence of a nonresident defendant's injury-causing product in the forum when that presence is attributable to intervening user conduct, the
opinion limits jurisdictional reach more than some courts might have
contemplated. At the same time, by casting the due process clause in
the role of protecting nonresident defendants from jurisdictional surprise, the opinion may point toward a jurisdictional reach longer than
some courts might have anticipated. Where a nonresident defendant's
significant contacts with the forum make actions of a particular kind
reasonably foreseeable, jurisdiction over an action of that kind may be
appropriate, even though the specific action did not arise out of those
contacts. In addition, a court's longer jurisdictional reach would be
available for both in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction. I think
World-Wide Volkswagen has precisely that effect.
111. Id at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
112. Id at 209.
113. Id at 204.
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